The identity of "Deep Throat", a pseudonym of the information source in the Watergate scandal, remained mysterious for more than three decades. In 2005, an ex-FBI official claimed that he was the anonymous source. Nevertheless, some are still inconvinced.
Introduction
In the early of 1970s, Woodward and Bernstein, two reporters of Washington Post, broke many stories that eventually led to the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon. This is the famous Watergate scandal in the history of the United States. The information source, assumed the pseudonym "Deep Throat", remained confidential for more than three decades. Woodward and Bernstein guaranteed that they would not reveal Deep Throat's identity unless he is willing to or he died. It is not till 2005 that, Felt, the ex-FBI No. 2, claimed that he was the anonymous source for Watergate affairs.
From this story, we learn some characteristics of being a "Deep Throat":
• Full-Anonymity. Keeping identity anonymous is the most important thing for Deep Throat. Even the president can not trace the information source. Felt is fortunate that the reporters are dependable. If they were threatened or bribed, the identity of Deep Throat may be exposed much early.
• Group Authenticity. Although we can not learn the identity of Deep Throat, we should be able to verify that the information comes from a specific organization for these inside stories. The two reporters described above knew that the information from Felt is trustworthy because Felt was working in FBI at that time.
• Self-Identifiability. After the event, in order to benefit from the identity or witness in the court, Deep Throat should be able to prove that he is the information source. In fact, although the Washington Post confirmed that Felt was Deep Throat, some people still question that.
Based on these characteristics, we try to construct a signature scheme in the following scenario.
David, an employee of a government organization, owns a personal signing key issued by the organization. He uses this key to sign official documents. One day, he discovers a startling scandal inside the organization. He decides to be a "Deep Throat", i.e. anonymously expose it to people. So he uses his signing key to generate a signature on a report of the scandal on behalf of the organization rather than his personal identity, and sends it to a journalist. The journalist first verifies that the information indeed comes from someone inside the organization, and then publishes it. No one, including the chief of the organization who owns the master secret key, can determine the identity of Deep Throat. After that, David continues his work in that organization as usual. Someday, if David wishes to, he can exhibit a witness identifying himself as Deep Throat.
Consider the existent signature schemes which may achieve this objective. For group signatures, there is a group manager with identifiability. David will be afraid to expose the scandal. For ring signatures, David needs to collect all public keys (or identities) of the staff in the organization to form the ring. The computation and communication costs are too large to be practical. Besides, in some secret agency, the identities of its staff are classified. David may not be able to get the public keys of other secret agents.
In this paper, we propose a new notion of identity-committable signatures (ICS) which fits for the above scenario. A member of an organization can sign a message on behalf of himself (regular signature) or the organization (identity-committed signature). In the latter case, the signer's identity is hidden from anyone, and can be opened by himself only. We describe the requirements of ICS and give the formal definition of it. Then we extend the notion of ICS to group-oriented ring signatures (GRS) which further allow the signer to hide his identity behind multiple groups. Deep Throat who works in FBI can sign secrets on behalf of numerous related organizations such as FBI, CIA, NSA, etc. The size of the signature is only linear to the number of included organizations. Since the signer can include the whole members of a group at a time, a GRS scheme is more efficient and practical than general ring signature schemes.
Related Works. In fact, ICS are intermediate between group signatures and ring signatures. We consider some concrete constructions of these two signature schemes:
• Group signatures: The notion of group signatures was introduced by Chaum and Van Heyst [17] . Since then, many other schemes were proposed [18, 15, 12, 13, 3, 6, 4, 9, 25, 11] . Some works mentioned separability [26, 14] , where the identifying ability can be designated to a revocation manager. It is possible to use such separable group signature to construct ICS, but we try to find more direct and more efficient solutions. Some group signature schemes with traceability [24, 31] give the signer self-identifiability, but there is still a group manager identifying the signer.
• [20, 30, 5] . All these schemes need a private key generator (PKG) with a master secret. In fact, we can regard signers under the same PKG as the members of a group. So signing on behalf of the whole group is a better idea than signing on behalf of a list of group members. Even for constant-size schemes, the computation cost of the signing and verifying procedures are linear to the number of ring members.
Definition of ICS
In this section we give the formal definition of identity-committable signatures.
Components
An identity-committable signature scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• Setup(1 λ ): For the security parameter in unary, 1 λ , the algorithm chooses a master secret key K and outputs the corresponding public parameter µ.
• Extract(µ, ID, K): Output the private key SK for the identity ID.
• Sign(µ, m, SK): Output the regular signature σ on message m.
• Verify(µ, ID, m, σ): If σ is signed by ID's private key on m, output 'accept'; otherwise, output 'reject'.
• IC-Sign(µ, m, SK): Output an identity-committed signature σ IC on message m and a witness ω for identifying.
• IC-Verify(µ, m, σ IC ): If σ IC is signed by a private key of the organization on m, output 'accept'; otherwise output 'reject'.
• Identify(µ, ID, ω, σ IC ): If σ IC is a valid identity-committed signature and ω opens σ IC to ID, output 'valid'; otherwise output 'invalid'.
Let PKG be the private key generator of an organization. PKG first runs Setup, and publishes the public parameters. Then it issues the private key for each organization member by performing Extract. Each member uses Sign and Verify algorithms for regular signing and verification. When a member tries to anonymously sign a message, he performs ICSign to get the identity-committed signature and a witness. He outputs the signature to the verifier such that the verifier can verify it via the IC-Verify algorithm. The signer holds the witness secretly for later revealing his identity if he wants. Someday, he can execute Identify by using the witness to prove that he is the original signer.
Security Definition
Bellare et al. [7] characterize the fundamental properties of group signatures in terms of two crucial security requirements. But the two requirements are not sufficient for ICS. Informally speaking, an identity-committable signature scheme should satisfy the following properties.
1. Completeness: With the private key issued by the PKG of an organization, one can sign messages on behalf of himself or the organization. In the latter case, he can prove that he is the original signer.
2. Unforgeability: The scheme should be secure against existential forgery of regular signature under adaptively chosen message and identity attack.
3. ICS-Unforgeability: For someone outside the organization, the scheme should be secure against existential forgery of identity-committed signature under adaptively chosen message attack.
4. ICS-Anonymity: No one but the signer himself can identify the signer of an identitycommitted signature.
5. ICS-Binding: The identity-committed signature can only be opened to the original signer.
Formally, we have the following definition for an identity-committable signature scheme.
Definition 1 (Identity-Committable Signatures) Define the following oracles which can be queried adaptively by any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm (PPTA) A against the challenger C.
• Extract A (ID): C returns the private key for identity ID.
• Sign A (ID, m): C returns a regular signature of identity ID on message m.
• IC-Sign A (ID, m): C returns an identity-committed signature on m along with a witness which identifies ID as the signer.
An identity-committable signature scheme is secure if it meets the following requirements.
• Completeness. For any m and ID, it holds that
and
• Unforgeability. • ICS-Binding. Given the public parameters and access of all oracles, no PPTA A can output a valid identity-committed signature (m, σ IC ) and two witnesses (ID, ω) and (ID , ω ) with non-negligible probability.
Definition of GRS
In this section we give the formal definition of group-oriented ring signatures.
Components
A group-oriented ring signature scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• Setup(1 λ ): For the security parameter 1 λ , the algorithm chooses a master secret key K and outputs the corresponding public parameter µ.
• GR-Sign(L, m, SK): For the list L of public parameters of all groups, output a group-oriented ring signature σ GR on message m.
• GR-Verify(L, m, σ GR ): If σ GR is signed by a private key of a group in the list L, output 'accept'; otherwise output 'reject'.
Each PKG of groups first performs Setup, and publish the public parameters. It also issues the private key for each group member by performing Extract. When a signer wants to sign messages on behalf of some groups, he takes the public parameters of these groups to form the list L. Then the signer executes GR-Sign to generate the group-oriented ring signature. The verifier also takes the list L, and executes GR-Verify to confirm that σ GR is signed by a member of one group in L.
Security Definition
We have the following definition for a group-oriented ring signature scheme.
Definition 2 (Group-Oriented Ring Signatures) Define the following oracles which can be queried adaptively by any PPTA A against the challenger C with a list L of public parameters.
• Extract A (i, ID): C returns the private key for identity ID of the i-th group in L.
• A group-oriented ring signature scheme is secure if it meets the following requirements.
•
Completeness. For any m, ID and L, it holds that
• Unforgeability. 
Concrete Constructions
In this section we first think of a generic construction of ICS and then propose specific constructions of ICS and GRS.
Generic ICS Construction
We first provide a generic ICS scheme from an ID-based signature scheme and a commitment scheme. The signature scheme Σ = (Setup Σ , Extract Σ , Sign Σ , Verify Σ ) is defined as the regular signature part of ICS components (Section 2.1). The commitment scheme Γ = (Commit Γ , Reveal Γ ) is defined as follows.
• Commit Γ (σ): For a secret σ, output a committed value γ and a witness ω.
• Reveal Γ (γ, ω): If γ is the commitment of σ, and ω is the corresponding witness, output the secret σ.
There are two requirements for a secure commitment scheme:
1. Hiding: Before reveal step, the receiver does not learn anything about the committed value.
2. Binding: The sender cannot change the committed value after the commit step.
The organization first designates a special ID G as the group identity, and issues the corresponding private key SK G along with personal private keys to all members. When a member wants to generate an identity-committed signature, he uses the key SK G to sign the message and commits his regular signature on that message. In the Identify process, the signer reveals the regular signature from the commitment. The detail is given as follows.
• Setup(1 λ ): Perform Setup Σ (1 λ ) to get the public parameters µ and master secret key K. Define a group identity ID G which differs from all members. Output (µ, ID G , K).
as the private key for identity ID.
• Sign(µ, m, SK ID ): Output the regular signature σ = Sign Σ (µ, m, SK ID ).
• Verify(µ, ID, m, σ): Output the result of Verify Σ (µ, ID, m, σ).
• IC-Sign(µ, m, SK G , SK ID ): Perform Commit Γ (σ) to get a committed value γ and a witness ω, where
Output the identity-committed signature σ IC = (σ G , γ) and the witness ω.
• IC-Verify(µ, m, σ IC ): Parse the identity-committed signature
Security. Completeness can be checked straightforwardly. Since the scheme makes use of Σ to generate regular signatures, unforgeability can be directly obtained from that of Σ.
Theorem 1 (Unforgeability) If there is an algorithm A that forges a regular signature of our scheme under adaptively chosen message and identity attack with advantage in time t, then there is an algorithm B which can forge a signature of Σ under the same attack with the same advantage in time O(t).
Proof. On input the public parameters of Σ, B gives A the same public parameters along with a reserved identity ID G . Then B simulates oracles queries in the following ways:
• Extract A (ID): Send ID and ID G to the oracle Extract B of Σ, and return the results SK ID and SK G to A.
• Sign A (ID, m): Pass (ID, m) to the oracle Sign B of Σ, and return the result signature σ to A.
• The ICS-Anonymity requirement follows the hiding property of Γ.
Theorem 3 (ICS-Anonymity) If there is an algorithm A that breaks ICS-Anonymity requirement with advantage in time t, then there is an algorithm B which can break the binding property of Γ with the same advantage in time O(t).
Proof. The algorithm B plays the ICS-Anonymity game with A and simulates oracle access as the real scheme. When A sends two identities and a message, B computes the corresponding signatures to get the challenge committed value γ, and computes σ IC as the real scheme. Finally, B outputs the guess of A. We can see that B succeeds in distinguishing the committed values of two secrets with the same advantage. Moreover, if Γ has perfect hiding property, the scheme is information-theoretically anonymous. 2
The ICS-Binding requirement follows the binding property of Γ.
Theorem 4 (ICS-Binding) If there is an algorithm A that breaks ICS-Binding requirement with advantage in time t, then there is an algorithm B which can break the binding property of Γ with the same advantage in time O(t).
Proof.
The algorithm B generates public parameters and simulates oracle access as the real scheme. If A outputs an identity-committed signature (σ G , γ) and two witnesses (ID, ω), (ID , ω ) 
Although the generic scheme meets the security requirements of ICS, it is weak in some scenario while all group members use the same private key to generate identity-committed signatures. For example, if Alice signs a personal message in the private communication with Bob, Bob may use Alice's signature to generate an identity-committed signature, and then frame Alice as Deep Throat. Moreover, the generic scheme loses some additional properties such as chosen-linkability and private-communicability introduced later.
The ICS Scheme Based on Pairings
Let G and G 1 be two cyclic groups of prime order p. We write G additively and G 1 multiplicatively. Let e : G × G → G 1 is a map with the following properties:
• Bilinear: for all P, Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z, e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab .
• Non-degenerate: for some P ∈ G, e(P, P ) = 1.
We say that G is a bilinear group [23] if the group operations in G and G 1 , and the bilinear map are efficiently computable.
Our scheme needs three following complexity assumptions. The first two are the discrete logarithm problem and the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in bilinear group G. The third one is the Diffie-Hellman problem with chosen bases.
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). The discrete logarithm problem in an (additive)
cyclic group G is, given P, aP ∈ G, to output a ∈ Z p . We say that a PPTA algorithm A has advantage in solving DLP in G if
The DL assumption in G holds if no PPTA A has non-negligible advantage in solving DL problem in G.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP). The computational Diffie-Hellman problem in an (additive) cyclic group G is, given P, aP, bP ∈ G, to output abP ∈ G. We say that a PPTA algorithm A has advantage in solving CDHP in G if
The CDH assumption in G holds if no PPTA A has non-negligible advantage in solving CDH problem in G.
Chosen-Base CDH Problem (CB-CDHP).
The chosen-base CDH problem in an (additive) cyclic group G is, given P, aP, bP ∈ G, to output Q, abQ ∈ G\{e G }, where e G is the identity of G. We say that a PPTA algorithm A has advantage in solving CB-CDHP in G if
The CB-CDH assumption in G holds if no PPTA A has non-negligible advantage in solving CB-CDH problem in G.
The Scheme. The algorithms of our construction are described as follows. The construction is based on the ID-based signature scheme proposed by Cha and Cheon [16] , which can be proved secure in the random oracle model.
• Setup(1 λ ): On input security parameter 1 λ , randomly choose two groups G and G 1 , a bilinear map e and a generator P defined above. Choose two random values x, y ∈ Z p , compute P X = xP and
Choose three cryptographically secure hash functions
Output (x, y) as the master secret key and µ = (G, G 1 , e, P, P X , P Y , H 1 , H 2 , H 2 ) as the public parameters.
• Extract(µ, ID, x, y):
Output (Q ID , S ID ) as the private key for identity ID.
• Sign(µ, m, Q ID , Q ID , S ID ): Compute
where r ∈ R Z p and h = H 2 (m, U ). Output the regular signature σ = (Q ID , U, V ).
• Verify(µ, ID, m, σ): Parse the regular signature σ as (Q ID , U, V ).
= e(Q ID , P ) and e(U, P Y )
If both equations hold, output 'accept'; otherwise output 'reject'.
• • IC-Verify(µ, m, σ IC ): Parse the identity-committed signature σ IC as (Q, Q , U, V ).
= e(Q , P ) and e(U, P Y )
• Identify(µ, ID, w, σ IC ):
is a valid identity-committed signature and Q ID = w −1 Q, output 'valid'; otherwise output 'invalid'.
Note that we cannot verify whether w = 1 in the IC-Verify algorithm. One may directly use a standard signature for some ID as an identity-committed signature. However, this is reasonable because ICS is designed for exposing messages. If someone already signed a message m, then the identity-committed signature for the same m is meaningless.
The security argument of this construction can be found in Appendix A. Additional Properties. In addition to the properties of ICS we defined, our construction provides two characteristics.
• Chosen-Linkability. The signer can decide the linkability of his identity-committed signatures. If a signer wants to show that some identity-committed signatures are signed by him, he can use the same witness w to mask his identity. The verifier knows that the signatures with the same Q come from the same signer.
• Private-Communicability. One can privately communicate with the signer of an identitycommitted signature without revealing the signer's identity. For an identity-committed signature (Q, Q , U, V ), one can treat Q as the public key of the signer, and encrypt messages using Boneh and Franklin's IBE scheme [10] (let Q be the hashed value of H 1 ). The ciphertext can be posted onto some bulletin board, and only the original signer 2 can decrypt the message.
Group-Oriented Ring Signatures
Abe et al. [1] proposed a ring signature scheme that allows mixed use of different flavors of keys at the same time. All participants can choose their keys with different parameter domains. By applying their construction to our ICS scheme, we get an efficient GRS scheme. A signer can sign messages on behalf of the organization which he belongs to, and then take the public parameters of other organizations to form a ring signature. These groups have their own public parameters, respectively. First, we slightly modify IC-Sign and IC-Verify of our ICS scheme to be a three-move type signature scheme.
• IC-Sign'(µ, m, Q ID , S ID ): Randomly choose a value w ∈ Z * p \{1}, compute Q = wQ ID , Q = wQ ID , U = rQ and V = (r + h)S, where S = wS ID , r ∈ R Z p and h = H 2 (m, Q, e(U, P Y )). Output the identitycommitted signature σ IC = (Q, Q , h, V ) and the witness w.
• IC-Verify'(µ, m, σ IC ): Parse the identity-committed signature σ IC as (Q, Q , h, V ).
Compute
= e(Q , P ) and h
It is easy to see that the modification does not affect the security proof of the original scheme.
2 )|1 ≤ i ≤ n} be the list of public parameters of the n groups that the signer wants to form the ring. Assume that the signer belongs to the s-th group. The GRS scheme is as follows.
• Setup and Extract: The same as the algorithms of the ICS scheme.
• GR-Sign(L, m, Q ID , S ID )
Y ) where r ∈ R Z p .
Finally, compute
• GR-Verify(L, m, σ GR ) For i = 1, . . . , n, compute
where
Certainly, the signer can also add some single persons to the list of the ring. By the generic construction of [1] , these individual public keys can be "three-move type" or "trapdoor-one-way type". Therefore, this extension improves the efficiency of ring signatures without loss of generality.
We provide security proofs in Appendix B.
Conclusions
In this paper we introduce the new notion of identity-committable signatures that allow the signer to "commit" his identity on the signature generated on behalf of the signer's group. Later, the signer can open the identity and prove that he is the original signer. Furthermore, we also introduce the extension of ICS, group-oriented ring signatures, which can be regarded as a very efficient and practical ring signature scheme. We give the definitions of ICS and GRS schemes. Finally, we provide the implementations providing unconditional anonymity, chosen-linkability and private-communicability.
[33] Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Yael Tauman. How to leak a secret. 
A Security Proofs of The ICS Scheme
In addition to the three oracles Extract A , Sign A and IC-Sign A defined in Section 2.2, we provide three hash oracles
Without loss of generality, we assume that all adversary algorithms query oracles with the same input at most once, and query H 1 (ID) before ID is used as an input of queries to H 2 , Extract, Sign and IC-Sign. The proof techniques are similar to that of the underlying signature scheme [16] . Since the completeness requirement can be checked straightforward, we provide the other security arguments as follows. Proof. On input ID and system parameters, A 1 performs the following steps:
2. Execute A on the given system parameters. When A queries to 
Moreover, since j is randomly chosen, we have
By combining these equations, we have Proof. Given a CDHP instance (P, aP, bP ), B computes abP by performing the following steps:
1. Choose an identity ID for A 1 . Let P X = xP and P Y = aP , where x is randomly chosen from Z p . Let q H 1 be the maximum number of queries to H 1 . Define the oracles queried by A 1 as follows, where i, i j , i k , i l denotes the i-th H 1 query, the j-th Extract query, the k-th Sign query and the l-th IC-Sign query, respectively.
Note that h k and h l will be stored as the result of the queries to H 
By the above two lemmas, the following theorem holds. We can see that since Q = wQ ID = wP and Q = w Q ID = w aP , the value a is properly computed. Moreover, since H 1 is modeled as a random oracle, the output distribution of all oracles queried by A are indistinguishable from the distribution of the real scheme. 2. Run A with the given parameters and oracles until it outputs a valid signature (L * , h (1) , (Q (1) , Q (1) , V (1) ), . . . , (Q (n * ) , Q (n * ) , V (n * ) )), where L * = (µ * (1) , . . . , µ * (n * ) ). If µ (î) / ∈ L * , output fail and abort. Otherwise, replay it with the same random tape, but different choices of H A 2 queries such that A outputs another valid signature (L * , h (1) , (Q (1) , Q (1) , V (1) ), . . . , (Q (n * ) , Q (n * ) , V (n * ) )), where h (1) = h (1) and V (i) = V (i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n * }.
3. Suppose that µ * (i * ) = µ (î) . Compute and output (h (i * ) − (h (i * ) ) −1 (V (i * ) − V (i * ) ) if both outputs are expected ones. Otherwise, output fail.
We can see that the oracles output correct keys and signatures as desired. Proof. Consider a valid signature (L * , h (1) , (Q (1) , Q (1) , V (1) ), . . . , (Q (n * ) , Q (n * ) , V (n * ) )). Since all (Q (i) , Q (i) , V (i) ) are equally distributed for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the adversary cannot identify the group that the signer belongs to. The remaining value h (1) is uniquely determined from (L * , m) and (Q (i) , V (i) )'s. Moreover, by Theorem 7, we know that the signature of a single group is also information-theoretic anonymous. 2
